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BLACK LAW PROFESSORS AND THE
INTEGRITY OF AMERICAN
LEGAL EDUCATION
Henry J. Richardson. III*
INTRODUCTION

These reflections grow from a comment made by Professor James
Jones** during a meeting of the AALS Section on Minority Groups, San
Francisco, 1974, where he perceptively observed the need for Black law
professors as a group to understand their relation to and role in American
legal education, even where there are no minority law students in particular
law schools.
I know of no writing on this particular issue, perhaps because of a tacit
assumption among Black law professors and others that such issues are too
crass to raise, and that the inquiries involved in thinking them through were
somehow unneeded in the 'civilized' reaches of legal education. Such tacit
assumptions are shortsighted, and to the extent that they forestall inquiry,
over-optimistic in light of the history of Black people in the United States. In
every field of endeavor, especially the more prestigious, Black people have
arrived late over great opposition, and departed early during times of economic stress to cries of 'necessity.' Those who have remained have borne the
twin burdens of being Black and being required to do a competitively
superlative job, often against expectations to the contrary. Such situations
have led Black people to ask, 'Why am I here?' or, more seriously, others to
ask, 'Why is he/she here?' The imperative of inquiring into such questions in
the context of legal education is already upon us, as was obvious in San
Francisco.
The need to develop a principled vantage point relative to Black law
professors may not yet be as dire as that implied by Samuel Yette in The
Choice is Survival,' but events and problems have shown the desirability of doing so beyond any tacit or express assumption to the contrary. Further, since
the profound impact of Black people on American history is now common
wisdom, we may suspect that attempts to understand the role of Black law
professors in American legal education cannot be confined to procedural
arrangements and affirmative action statistics. Rather, such attempts must
press on to examine the constitutive features of American legal process, as
*

Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington): Visiting Associate

Professor of Law, Northwestern U. Law School 1975-1976. My colleagues, Professors Julius

Getman and Alan Schwartz, and Professor Derrick Bell, contributed useful comments on an
earlier draft. With them is shared any credit for this essay, while whatever errors occurred
despite their efforts.

** Professor Jones' remarks are reprinted in full at 488, supra.
1. New York, Putnam Press (1971).
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well as those of the relationship of Black people to America. Hence, the
reflections that follow.
The path of inquiry begins with identifying and clarifying three major
premises that seem to undergird American Black/white relations:
(1) that one purported 'mission' of Black people is to be a redemptive
force for the collective soul of white people;
(2) that Black-white social interaction is a dominant reality; and
(3) that (1) and (2) above convey a notion of a process of reciprocal
enrichment between Blacks and whites, from which stems the core
of the inquiry: the relationship of Black law professors to enrichment of legal process and legal education.
Enrichment must be considered relative to new obligations introduced into
the law that are consonant with major goals of legal process and the wider
community. A significant source of such obligations has been the confrontation between American legal process and the Black Experience; they extend
across the entire scope of legal process, and enrich both sides of that clash.
Evaluating these obligations from this source, for their meaning relative to
enrichment, leads to their evaluation in light of four illustrative jurisprudential questions arising in this century. Discussing those questions in connection
with enrichment highlights the dichotomy between the abolition of racism on
the one hand, and causes of action at law on the other. It further illuminates
contributions of the Black Experience directly to legal process by both
introducing new obligations, and by stimulating new thinking on jurisprudential questions.
Black law professors are inevitably of the Black Experience as they are
also legal scholars, and are therefore in the best position to systematically
understand and communicate the conjunctions and disjunctions between Law
and the Black Experience as they impact on legal process. This impact is of
present and increasing significance: because of the intersection of social
perspectives in the Black Community with selected issues in the majority
white community; because obligations introduced into legal process by Black
litigation are now being mobilized by other deprived American groups;
because the jurisprudential questions raised by this introduction of new
obligations go to the heart of American thinking about law and promise to
recur in other contexts; and because the impact of the Black Experience on
American law is now irrevocable. Thus the sum total of the foregoing must
be incorporated within the training of all who would be lawyers because this
is what the Law has become and is becoming. Not to do so would undermine
the integrity of American legal education. Black law professors are essential
as both scholars and conveyers of the Black Experience, to meet this need.
As noted above, some clarification of basic social premises in Blackwhite relationships in America as they affect Black law professors must
precede any such inquiry.
CLARIFICATION OF PREMISES

The first premise concerns the purported "mission" of Black people to
"save" - be a redemptive force for - the collective soul of white people. This
premise has at least two facets: 1) Black people 'forgive' white people for
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past racist sins, and then join with them to sail off together into the sunset to
build a new society. 2) Black people bring the Black Experience into the
collective experience of white people, thus enriching it because (a) white
people's lives are collectively sterile (technologically oriented to the suppression of the passions) while the Black Experience restores the passions
through the African connection and its American derivations; and (b)
change is the law of life and Black people are sources of new perspectives for
change, and new demands the accommodation to which produces change.
Inquiring into this premise is significant in that it underpins the notion of
enrichment of American legal process, to which we return in a moment.
A second premise is that the moral arguments above, and indeed this
entire essay, presuppose some ongoing social interaction of Black and white
people, as contrasted with Black nationalist aspirations for the separation of
Black and white societies. On the basis of past, present and projected realities
such separation within the United States is impossible, and has been for quite
some time, at least in important areas of power and wealth interactions. Thus
proximity and intermingling are inevitable, and put in issue the factors
involved in regulating this interaction. To state the obvious here intends to
emphasize the interdependencies of American society among Blacks and
whites, and to recall that these were intense even during slavery-the period
of the most sustained and oppressive attempt at segregation-because of the
common humanity of both groups locked into the same system on the same
territory.2 This is no less true now, in different forms, for legal education,3
4
and the legal process as discussed hereafter.
Redemptive forgiveness rationales do not seem key to inquiring into the
role that Black law professors should play, for at least two reasons. First, they
are not in a position to forgive white people for anything as representatives of
Black people, because they are too elite as a group to be that representative.
Secondly, redemptive forgiveness is a question consciously to be decided by
2. See generally Genovese's excellent ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES
MADE (Pantheon, 1974), for example at 30-31, 47-49, 88-89.
3. The interdependency between a quality legal education and equal access under the law
for all who would potentially walk into those classrooms was recognized by the Supreme Court
as long ago as Sweatt v. Painter,339 U.S. 629, 633-35 (1949). Recognition of this interdependency was implicitly continued in DeFunis v. Odegaard (Douglas, dissenting) 416 U.S. 312,
333, 336 (1974) in that the context was constantly recalled of there being only a limited
number of places in that institution of legal education, and that equal protection issues must be
resolved among interacting groups and individuals in that particular framework. In this
connection, see also Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection
Clause: An Analysis of the Competing Argument, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343, 361 et seq.
(1974).
4. The first premise is not exclusive of "progressive" Marxist-oriented cutting-edge
political thought in the Black community, which theoretically aims for unification of working
class transracial groups for construction of a new political force to, inter alia, abolish racism.
That is, socialism as an antidote to racism. This kind of thinking is encompassed by the
forgiveness and enrichment issues in the first premise, unless racism can be eliminated by
removing certain economic structural factors in the society. However, the alternative view is
taken here: removal of those factors would not guarantee the abolition of racism. The argument
here in part is that socialism-as-abrogating-racism still implies the validity of both enrichment
and forgiveness issues, at least until the arrival of American socialism proves us wrong, or until
the obligation on white America for past racism is discharged under some condition of
forgiveness or recompense, for example, through effective payment of just reparations.
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Black people, e.g. relative to reparations. 5 Black law professors, however,
may well comprise an important group of brokers to help ensure that white
people are not redeemed (vis-a-vis major attitudes among Black people) until
Black people can know, understand and validly consent to terms and conditions of such forgiveness. This comprises, among other things, a question of
law in its most profound sense, 6 and Black law professors should be in the
forefront of formulating it.
Therefore, enrichment rationales emerge as most pertinent to the rest of
our inquiry.
In this connection a third premise emerges. Enrichment is a two-way
street. Black people have also arguably been "enriched" by white people,
especially regarding modernization, industrialization, technology, all as part
of a process again beginning with the slavery experience. One immediate
question is whether the latter really constitutes enrichment, in terms of values
most cherished in the Black community. 7 But no matter whether this gets an
affirmative, negative or indecisive answer, the process certainly constitutes
interchange incorporated into the Black Experience. Accordingly, our vantage point is not that of a separate group deciding upon assimilation, but of a
partially assimilated group who are presumptively in the midst of a process of
reciprocal though unequal and unfair interchange with white society.8
5. See Richardson, Between Law and Justice: Professor Bittker's Case for Black Reparations, INDIANA L.J. (forthcoming, Spring 1975).
6. It is such a question not only in the Hohfeldian sense that it deals with reciprocal
rights and obligations on a broad scale, but equally because, with respect to two groups of
participants in national social processes, the question of payment of Black reparations immeditely focuses on community expectations about the authority of decision-makers within the
general community to make decisions allocating resources among and within the two groups.
See BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973), at 71-86.
7. It is a commonplace that industrial social values, previously thought to convey only
benefits, have not been called into question across the board not only from the suspicion that
they may be too expensive in terms of other resources, but also that they may be fundamentally
destructive to the human spirit. This suspicion is no less present on certain levels in the Black
Community for various reasons. For example, the statistical indicators that tend to implement
such industrial values have been inadequate at the least and oppressive at the most in their
being used to regulate, among other things, the relationship between Black people and the
majority American society. Cf. ROZAK, WHERE THE WASTELAND ENDS: POLITICS AND TRANSCENDANCE IN POSTINDUSTMAL SOCIETY (Doubleday, 1972) at 33-40, 50-53, 58-59, 64-67.
8. It is clear to most if not all Black people that this life'inter-change has been unequal
and unfair on many levels. This clarity however has not been reflected in legal outcomes under
the Equal Protection Clause, e.g. in the area of legal education. American legal process has had
considerable difficulty responding to the ripple effects of white discrimination against Black
people, and especially in finding rationales to justify educational policies that respond to those
ripples for what they are, e.g. attacking such ripples in legal education as in DeFunis. The
presumption still persists of the fairness of the interchange unless otherwise proved, and
opportunities are taken on short notice to strengthen the presumption by pointing to superficial
economic criteria to indicate a lack of unfairness and thus less need for corrective policies. E.g.
in raising the issue of whether the offspring of Black upper middle class income parents should
be eligible for minority admissions evaluation at a given law school. See REDISH, supra, at 39596. Such economic criteria are almost totally beside the point because of the racism in the
surrounding society pressing on both students and parents, including on the former in the
supposedly advantageous educational institutions they attended. Such economic advantage as
they enjoyed may well have gone mostly into ensuring psychic survival; this is vastly different
from the Black student emerging from that institution on an equal footing with students who
have never encountered such racism and who have even reaped its majority advantages. Yet,
reference to these realities produces distinct scholarly, not to mention judicial, unease. Id. at
399.
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The working assumption here is that this interchange has conveyed a mixture
of enrichment and detriment both from white to Black, and from Black to
white. For present purposes, the task is to identify Black to white enrichment
factors in a defined area of interchange: the legal process, and particularly
the scholarship, education, and appraisal mechanisms within legal process.
Stating the problem in this manner requires some definition of "enrichment," and then an exploration of the relationship of Black law professors to
enrichment of legal process and legal education.
ENRICHMENT OF LAW AND THE BLACK EXPERIENCE

If we start from the proposition that the legal process must grow to
remain consonant enough with social processes to be viable, that such growth
necessitates change, and that such change has much to do with the aspirations, hopes and fears of the human participants in the processes of the law,
then we might be at least halfway towards saying that all growth in the law
constitutes enrichment of the law. But only halfway, because enrichment
must refer also to the objectives of the major participants in the legal process
relative to the values and goals they are seeking to enhance.
By way of fixing the outer limits, two crude examples illustrate legal
change without enrichment. Refinements of legal procedures in Nazi Germany ultimately designed to move Jews more efficiently to concentration camps
and gas chambers, or equally, refinements in Soviet law under Stalin in the
late 1920's and early 1930's designed to easily obtain the process "confessions" of those victimized during the Communist Party purges, are not here
considered to be either growth or enrichment because they grossly affront, in
both their substance and procedures, values that mankind universally aspires
to preserve and that are also inherently brutal. Even if the above may be
argued as 'growth' in the law in terms of changes over time via an accumulation of new subject-matter and procedures, it still does not constitute 'enrichment.' It likely constitutes neither, but the distinction need not further disturb
us here. Similarly, it need not do so relative to those principles and procedures facilitating American slavery.
Since enrichment is not a value-neutral concept but refers to the valuecontent of that which is introduced, we are on safer ground if we look for
enrichment in the direction of new obligations incorporated within the law
that are consonant with major goals of legal process of the facilitation of
social change, the preservation of human dignity, and the maintenance of
minimum public order. This direction points us towards the source of such
new obligations. The late British international legal scholar, J. N. Brierly, has
perceptively noted that the source of legal obligations lies outside of the legal
process, deriving from the values, aspirations and plans in the wider community of human society. 9 This would seem not only the case for international
law, but for law in national communities as well. In the United States, one
source of legal obligations is the confrontation between the American (whitecontrolled) legal process and the Black Experience. This is even more
apparent, and indeed self-evident, because the values, goals and objectives
9. BRiERLY,

THE LAW OF NATIONS,

54-56 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963).
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that Black people have generally sought when utilizing the legal process are
nowhere near the abyss of the above Soviet and Nazi examples, but are well
within the goals, values and ideals of the Founding Fathers of the country
and within the expressed goals of the international community.
The confrontation between the Black Experience and American Law is
best conceived as an ongoing process. With significant exception, the strategy
from the side of the former has generally been one of litigation." ° Litigation is
one of the primary pipelines by which outside influences are channeled into
legal process in ways significant enough to alter it; indeed, we know this as
the essence of the Common Law which incorporates the doctrine of stare
decisis, on the one hand, a doctrine challenged in empirical form by the legal
history of its frequent circumvention by the courts, on the other. Thus many
litigants sue the court to impose a new obligation from their own perspectives
on the respondent, or at least one not previously defined in the precise
demanded form. And so it has been for the collective litigation of the Black
Experience.
What new obligations has the Black Experience sought and to what
extent has that litigation been successful? A complete answer to that question
would come close to providing the jurisprudential meaning of civil rights
litigation for American law: how has this widespread sustained attempt inthe
context of a social movement by ex-slaves, with the resulting judicial outcomes now being employed by other American groups' objects of deprivation
to introduce their new obligations into the American legal process, changed
the way of thinking about law in the United States, and arguably in the larger
international community?
A full answer is impossible in the context of this essay, for it would
literally require a history of Black people and the Law." For present purposes, we may note that new obligations sought to be imposed by the Black
Experience extend across a wide scope of legal process, 2 though certain
general areas (e.g. school desegregation) have obviously attracted more
attention than others. Black people further have framed, invoked and sought
to have prescribed new legal obligations in doctrinal areas of the law not
commonly associated with the Struggle, e.g. antitrust law as the basis of a
claim to prevent real estate developers from conspiring to prohibit sales of
property to Black people.' s This wide scope only reflects the truism that the
Black Experience has in some way reached into every corner of American
life.
When a Black claim is successfully made out in an area of the law
previously so "untouched," legal expectations are enhanced by the extension
10. The exceptions must include the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, and perhaps the
following Congressionally enacted civil rights legislation: Voting Rights Act - 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1973-1973p (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964 - 42 U.S.C. §

1971, 1975a-1975d, 20N0a-

2000h-6; Public Accommodations Provisions - 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
11. Derrick Bell, however, in RAcE, RActsM AND AMiICAN LAW, (Little, Brown & Co.,
1973) has come close enough to provide us with much valuable source material and food for
thought along these lines.

12. See e.g. Bell, supra n.l1, Table of Contents, pp. ix-xviii, and also L. MILLER, Tim
PETITIONERS:

THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES AND THE NEGRO

(1966).
13. Bratcher v. Akron Area Board of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967).
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into that area of the principle of non-discrimination against Blacks, as
subsequently applied to similar future problems. Such extension also enhances the Black Experience by providing, through a court order, leverage to
enable Black people to more fully participate in or enjoy activities formerly
encumbered by restrictions. It is a two-way street therefore, with enrichment
arguably traveling in both directions. But this reciprocity also calls into
question somewhat Brierly's original perception that the source of legal
obligation necessarily lies outside of the legal process. Because where there
are a few basic principles in a body of law of signal social impact, their
subsequent application to future legal problems may be of significance in
formulating new obligations equal to that from Brierly's crystallization of
social expectations into a new principle and applied to the same problem.
However, to understand whether a particular obligation introduced by a
specific case derives from one source or the other requires an intimate and
fundamental understanding of the social and economic process and progress
of the Black Experience in this country. On this basis Brierly's conclusion
retains some vigor, but there is still a question to be resolved.
This jurisprudential question as to the source of legal obligations that is
raised by the Black Experience confronting American Law is the first of four
such questions that will be noted here. That they are raised by this confrontation, and that a journey into the Black Experience is required for their
resolution is indicative of the enrichment brought to American Law by Blackintroduced obligations. We begin to see that enrichment is itself a process
and, at least in part, conveys a notion of releasing potentially new answers
from certain basic questions by reapproaching them from a fresh value
direction. This seems a more accurate conception than a straight two-orthree-line-inclusive-definition, because the interaction between American
Law and the Black Experience is itself a dynamic process. Accordingly, we
move on to consider a second such question.
Part of the meaning of civil rights court decisions is that Black people
using the federal courts have sometimes been able to gain at least temporary
enforcement of their rights in communities where the majority of people
were opposed. This has often involved flirtations with a breakdown of public
order, as in Little Rock, Selma and Boston, and has required outside coercive
force to prevent a complete breakdown. It further brings into view another
jurisprudential dictum, Justice Holmes' observation that "A right is what a
given crowd will fight for successfully." 14 But the confrontation between law
and the Black Experience suggests that a right just might be something more,
and thus raises our second jurisprudential question.
Holmes' dictum did point in the direction of the rise of the legal realism
school of American jurisprudence. Part of the meaning of that advent was the
shift of the basis of law as commands from some institutional or theologically-derived lawgiver, on the one hand, to the events, hopes, fears, and expectations of the people who are to be regulated by it. The substance of a right
then, no longer depends upon the historical or theological validity of its
formulations, but rather on procedures in the courts and in other arenas by
14. This general question has been well raised by Francis Biddle in
NATURAL LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT (Macmillan, 1961).

JuSTIcE HOLMEe%
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which the right is invoked, prescribed and applied. 15 This philosophy can be
said to be predominant today, especially in legal education.1" For our purposes here it has produced several outcomes, among them vastly increased
attention to the concept, details, enforceability, and integrity of procedural
due process of law.
Again, this is no place to write a history of Black people and the
Fourteenth Amendment, but the secularization of thinking about the law has
put a premium on the dividing line between deprivations to people that the
law will recognize - especially in subtle, relatively intimate contexts - and
those deprivations that although very real to the people involved, will not be
recognized and therefore not remedied. The subtleties and intimacies of
illegitimate coercion by a state representative (for the purposes of 'state
action') are ultimately defined by reference to principles still retaining much
theological (natural law) content: 'fundamental fairness, due process, equal
protection,' but are evaluated in a social context where legal process is
increasingly thought of in terms of the expectations of the community. Where
state officials are mostly white and defendants Black, 'fundamental fairness'
relates directly to the detailed history of the interrelationship between the two
groups, and therefore to the nature of racism.
As much of racism is subtle as crude: Black people and the Black
Experience alone are experts on both. The overall legal question posed is not
as Black people would generally want the law to define it: What is racism and
once identified, how may legal process best eliminate it? Rather it is posed,
"Is this manifestation of racism a violation of a legal principle (equal
protection, due process, etc.) and accordingly what partial (re the abolition
of racism) remedy is available? The result here is that even if a successful
claim in litigation is made out and a new obligation created, procedural
completeness will often be negatively compared with substantive completeness; this produces a further conclusion of substantive incompleteness in
American law by some 23 million Black people in a nation of 202 million.
This substantive incompleteness produces our third jurisprudential question,
namely, the managing of the dichotomies in law between the realities of
racism, on the one hand, and the generally more limited 'established' causes
of action in legal process, on the other.
On its face, anyway, this Black Experience conclusion is consonant with
both natural law and legal realism conceptions of legal process. The conflict
between procedure and substance in this context bears much more reflection
if the law is to be understood (and taught) as more than a system of naked
control. Further, the ambiguity here produces our fourth jurisprudential
question, namely, the meaning of legal realism for Black people and others
17
who rely so heavily on certain constitutional rights of natural law origin.
15. See generally H. Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240
(1934); M. Radin, Legal Realism, 31 COLUMBIA L.R. 824 (1931); Biddle, supra, 16-17.
16. See Lasswell and McDougal, "Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest", (1943) reprinted in McDougal & Associates, infra; Brown, Recent
Trends in United States Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL ED. 283 (1974); cf. Richardson,
Reflections on Education in International Law in Africa, 4 DENVER J. OF INT'L LAW AND
POLICY 199, at 199-201 (1974).
17. See Biddle, supra, at 32. This issue as it directly relates to Black people was only raised

by Biddle in a tangential reference to Little Rock (at 36) by way of differentiating Holmes'
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Accordingly, while an all-inclusive definition of enrichment is not possible, these brief reflections do indicate that since the goals and objectives of
Black people seeking legal redress are consonant with wider community
goals, their introduction of certain new obligations into American law seems
to constitute enrichment of that law because of the values underpinning those
obligations, and because implementing such obligations has raised the distinct

possibility of getting new answers from the above jurisprudential questions
that could make American law more responsive to present and projected
community-wide problems.
ENRICHMENT AND BLACK LAW PROFESSORS

Black law professors are irrevocably of the Black Experience, and
relative to questions of jurisprudence and legal process such as the foregoing,
bring a unique collection of both structured and inchoate insights. These
insights collectively comprise a wellspring for the process of jurisprudential
enrichment which must be understood by any lawyer purporting to comprehend and utilize American law. This is true for reasons that relate to stare
decisis, but even more so to understanding law as a process of authoritative
decision'" in the immediate future of grinding decisions which must be made
about social, political, economic and human priorities in the United States
and throughout the world.
In the context of such decisions, the response of law schools and the
legal profession- and ultimately the entire American and world community-to the above four jurisprudential questions illustrative of those
born of the confrontation between the Black Experience and American Law,
will loom large in the courts and other legal arenas.' 9 Such questions are
significant because the impact of the Black Experience on American Law is
now historically irrevocable. Those early great Black litigators, especially
Charles Houston and Thurgood Marshall, 20 have more than amply ensured
this, as confirmed by the precedents now being cited in cases seeking to
establish obligations of civil rights to Indians, women, and Chicanos. Those
cases reveal the recitation of the early and recent cases confirming (or
"Right in the narrow legal sense" from "an activity to which men may believe they are entitled
but which cannot be achieved through a court of law". The issue of course for us, Biddle, and
Holmes is whether such a narrow conception of 'legal' right remains adequate and accurate in a
society where (1) the legal process is much more than what courts do (as recognized by
Biddle-Holmes, id.); (2) legal process is being called on to regulate an increasing number of
social activities; (3) the idea of the entire executive apparatus of a society being wrong both
morally and legally about virtually a universe of policies is now a familiar one; (4) the framers
of the Constitution arguably anticipated (3) above in the notion of checks and balances; and
(5) the concept of causes of action "in law" has now transcended national boundaries and
arguably will increasingly do so, e.g. as an outcome of the incremental yet real growth of the
international law of human rights. Arguably, one net effect of all of the above is to buttress
our skepticism about a one-to-one identity between the existence of a legal right and its instant
enforceability.
18. This concept of law (and this inquiry) has been substantially influenced by the work
of Professors Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell. See generally McDoUGAL AND AsSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

(1960).

19. Some indication of this is gleaned by substituting "sexism" for racism, mutatis
mutandis, in the discussion to this point.
20. See Burch, The Brown Strategists, 3 BLACK L.J. 115 (1974); McNeil, "Charles
Hamilton Houston", id. at 123. An article useful for placing these and other Black lawyers in
the concept of the Black Community is Tollett, Black Lawyers, Their Education, and the Black
Community, 17 How. L.J. 326 (1972).
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attempting to) the same or similar rights to Black people.2 1 The choice is no
longer open to judges, lawyers, scholars and others to reject the outcome of
the Black Experience-cum-legal-expectations. Though such cases may be
mis-cited, distinguished and limited, they must henceforth be dealt with via
some variant of the same judicial and litigational principles and strategies
which have built the common law. Further, this outcome has already begun
to be felt, albeit incompletely, in concepts of legal education. There is some
indication that Brown v. Board is emerging as a primary teaching tool in the
constitutional law classroom, supplanting in this role such ancient stalwarts as
Marbury v. Madison.2
Not only has the Black Experience had this major impact, but the future
seems to promise more of the same, if only because issues raised by, and the
perspectives of, various factions of the Black community intersect with similar
though differently-motivated issues brought to the fore by white groups. For
example, Black nationalistic desires for control over schools in Black ghettos
intersect with white neighborhood school plans; Black desires for control over
local police intersect with the wider question of urban decentralization; Black
proposals for land-use cooperatives and land banks intersect with wider issues
of regional planning, de-urbanization, and ecological conservation of land;
Black distrust of white policemen intersects with the issue of the use of state
coercion to suppress political dissidence. The list could be continued.2"
In future decades the impact of the Black Experience - in se and as a
legal stalking horse for other deprived American groups - is not likely to
diminish. The perspectives introduced by Black-oriented litigation seem to
have a continuing chance to be confirmed by the courts- in some measure as
new legal obligations, for two general reasons: (1) Because of probable
alliances with selected sentiments and trends primarily white-inspired; and
(2) the designation of legal issues, and therefore of significant court cases, as
critical or survival issues vis-a-vis the Black community, is likely to continue
to move upwards on the scale of subtlety following that of racist oppositione.g., from the crude issues of having to desegregate drinking fountains and
washrooms, to buses, to schools, to bussing, to employment in the context of
layoffs in an economic depression, to compensation plans and affirmative
21. See e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
22. I am grateful for Derrick Bell's confirmation of my intuition on this point, gleaned
from general discussions with others in legal education.
23. The wide range of such issues generated by the Black Experience leads us to examine
the converse proposition: that the relationship between Black law professors and the enrichment of legal process as discussed here, might well find close analogies in the relationship of
Black academics to other disciplines, e.g., political science, sociology, philosophy, as has been
suggested by Professor Jones. To anticipate the implications of this essay as completed, it would
seem, prima facie, that similar truths could indeed be identified relative to enrichment in most
if not all other disciplines. However, we focus here on law and legal education for two reasons,
the first of which, briefly, is the personal preference and vantage point of the author. But
secondly, law is unique as an intellectual discipline in that its inquiries, decisions, and students
graduated from its schools tend, on a continuing basis, to have early consequences for the
maintenace and quality of public order in the community. Further, there are substantial
expectations throughout the society for these kinds of wide ordering and value-allocating
decisions (in terms of e.g. power, wealth, and respect) to be made as a matter of legal process.
In a context so significant, clarification of the legitimacy of Black participation in legal
education might well influence the outcome of analogous issues in other disciplines, though this
bears further investigation beyond the scope of this essay.
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action, to the present need now to rid affirmative action programs of their
discrimination against Black people. These are among the most passionate
issues of American society because, among other reasons, Black people faced
with racism of the most interlacing and subtle nature in "gatekeeper" 24
institutions, (e.g. Bar Examinations) are frequently forced into the strategy
of advocating and working for the total abolition of such institutions (it being
impossible to enforce their equitability), notwithstanding meritorious functions otherwise performed by them for both Blacks and whites (i.e. the
enforcing of standards of professional competence in representing the interests of others).
Litigation against racism in all areas of the law, the new obligations it
imports into legal process, and consequent modification and evolution of
American law are now permanent features of the legal landscape and seem
destined to remain so. This evolution therefore must be understood and
taught in American law schools into the future, not to preserve a kind of
intellectual Maginot line for the survival of Black people, but because this is
what American Law has irrefutably become and continues in the process of
becoming. Such a realization does not amount to charity to Black scholars,
but rather an essential attempt to prevent a distortion of the education of all
lawyers and to preserve the integrity of American legal education.
As the previous discussion has indicated, the confrontation between the
Black Experience and American Law has not been one of two solid objects
colliding on their outside surfaces, but rather that of the infusion of a dye
throughout a cell. The jurisprudential questions already noted are only illustrative of a larger number that now doubtless arise and will arise throughout
legal process.2 5 The particular contributions which Black law professors can
make relative to resolving these questions stem from their dual role as 1)
carriers of the Black Experience, itself a sourcebook of non-legal influences
incorporated into law; 2) legal scholars who understand both the Law and
the Black Experience and can, in the most scholarly meaning of the term,
'make sense of' both the conjunctions and disjunctions between these two
historical forces as they impact on legal process.
It is left for future inquiry, with regard to the unique contributions
Black law professors have to make relative to each of these four questions, to
spell out the substantial actual or theoretical impact of the Black Experience
on understanding the particular issues involved. Such answers need not be
awaited, however, to conclude that Black law professors approaching and
contributing to legal scholarship, and teaching out of the Black Experience,
clearly enrich American law and are essential, in vastly greater numbers than
at present, to the minimum education of all lawyers in whatever law school.
24. This perceptive expression is that of Walter Leonard, Special Assistant to the President, Harvard University.
25. A fifth such question that could easily be added is that of the tort construct of the
"reasonable man", when used as a supposedly neutral concept in a non-homogeneous society,
emerging not as a touchstone of 'reasonableness' but as a technique of cultural and social
majoritarian control. See in this connection Richardson, "Black People, Technocracy and Legal
Process: Thoughts, Fears and Goals" in BARNETr AN STIcKLAND (eds.), POLrrlCAL AND
ECONOMIC STRATEGIES FOR BLACK PEOPLE IN THE COMING DECADES, (forthcoming, 1975).
coming, 1975).

